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ARTICLE
IN THE DEBT WE TRUST: THE
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF DEFAULTING
ON AMERICAN FINANCIAL




Starting in August 2011, America has undergone a series of fiscal and polit-
ical crises surrounding the threat of defaulting on the national debt and the need
to raise the debt ceiling. These crises have caused tremendous stress and irrepa-
rable harm to our financial markets and political system, causing a downgrade
in United States debt for the first time in history, forcing drastic budget cuts, and
contributing to a sixteen-day government shutdown this past October. What is
most unfortunate, however, is that all of this was preventable for the simple
reason that, as a matter of constitutional law, defaulting on the national debt is
impossible.
This article argues that, because actually defaulting on the national debt is
constitutionally impossible, Congress should take this impossibility as axio-
matic. Thus, Congress should either: 1) reinstate the “Gephardt Rule” (a proce-
dural rule that was used in prior Congresses to avoid a floor vote to raise the
debt ceiling); 2) make the “McConnell Mechanism” permanent; or, ideally, 3)
remove the debt ceiling altogether. Doing this would eliminate all future fiscal
crises and help restore comity and bipartisan discourse in Congress, while al-
lowing for economic growth and national financial stability.
I. INTRODUCTION
The summer of 2011 was a tumultuous time in American politics.1 A
Congress inspired by the Tea-Party movement and dedicated to a limited
federal government with minimal public expenditures, came within hours of
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1 See, e.g., Matt Bai, Obama v. Boehner: Who Killed the Debt Deal?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
28, 2012), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/01/magazine/obama-vs-boehner-
who-killed-the-debt-deal.html?pagewanted=all, archived at http://perma.cc/F44X-RMRB
(discussing the contentious debates between the Republican-led House and the Democratic-led
Senate and White House over the debt ceiling and deficit reduction measures).
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having the United States of America default on its debts for the first time in
the modern era and all in the name of fiscal responsibility.2 In the denoue-
ment of this story, opponents of this movement—ranging from liberals sup-
porting large government spending to economists, and business and market
analysts—recognized the disastrous cross-market implications of a default
on U.S. debt obligations.3 This led many to consider the notion that, as a
matter of constitutional law, it might actually be impossible for the United
States to default on its debts, and the President has the constitutional author-
ity to unilaterally raise the debt ceiling.4 This notion had wide support in
Democratic circles and was expressly endorsed by Congressional leaders
such as Senators Charles Schumer (D–NY)5 and then-Democratic Senatorial
Campaign Committee Chairwoman (now Budget Committee Chairwoman)
Patty Murray (D–WA),6 as well as former President William J. Clinton.7 Le-
gal scholars also analyzed the constitutionality of default under the Public
Debt Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as the ability of the Pres-
ident to take unilateral action to raise the debt ceiling himself, with varying
conclusions.8 President Obama balked at the notion,9 and fortunately, this
2 Catherine Rampell, The U.S. Has Defaulted Before, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX (Oct. 4,
2013), 3:00 PM, http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/10/04/the-u-s-has-defaulted-before/
?_php=true&_type=blogs&_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=1, archived at http://perma.cc/
H4HP-KWZ3. As Carmen Reinhart’s research illustrates, the United States has potentially de-
faulted twice in its history, first in 1790 and again in 1933 in the context of the gold clause
case of Perry v. United States. The first incident of default in 1790 is irrelevant to the analysis
of this article, as it preceded enactment of the Public Debt Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. And, as discussed below, the Court’s holding in Perry required the United States to
honor its obligation—causing the nation to not enter into default. Therefore, the debt crisis of
2011 was an unprecedented moment in Congressional history.
3 See, e.g., Jonathan Masters, U.S. Debt Ceiling: Costs and Consequences, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS (Aug. 2, 2001), http://www.cfr.org/international-finance/us-debt-ceiling-
costs-consequences/p24751, archived at http://perma.cc/YLF6-NPQF (stating that a default on
U.S. debt would cause an “acute fiscal crisis”).
4 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, The 14th Amendment, the Debt Ceiling and a Way Out, N.Y.
TIMES, July 24, 2011, at A10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/25/us/politics/
25legal.html, archived at http://perma.cc/8PRR-PWYR.
5 See Schumer: Using 14th Amendment To Raise Debt Limit Should Be “Explored”, REAL
CLEAR POLITICS (July 7, 2011), http://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2011/07/07/schumer_
using_14th_amendment_to_raise_debt_limit_should_be_explored_by_obama.html, archived
at http://perma.cc/CS87-RKKY.
6 Ryan Grimm & Samuel Hass, 14th Amendment: Democratic Senators See Debt Ceiling
As Unconstitutional, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 28, 2011, 6:12 AM), http://www.huffington
post.com/2011/06/28/14th-amendment-debt-ceiling-unconstitutional-democrats_n_886442
.html, archived at http://perma.cc/9GCV-DS9D.
7 James Oliphant, Bill Clinton would raise debt ceiling, bypass Congress, L.A. TIMES (July
19, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/19/news/la-pn-clinton-debt-ceiling-20110719,
archived at http://perma.cc/BL4R-UMJF.
8 Compare, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, How Would the Supreme Court Rule on Obama Raising
the Debt Ceiling Himself?, THE NEW REPUBLIC (July 29, 2011), http://www.tnr.com/article/
politics/92884/supreme-court-obama-debt-ceiling, archived at http://perma.cc/D273-3UPP
(finding it likely the Supreme Court would hold default impossible, and the President’s unilat-
eral action to be constitutionally permissible) with Laurence H. Tribe, A Ceiling We Can’t Wish
Away, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2011, at A23, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/08/
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unwillingness did not prove fatal as a compromise was eventually reached.10
However, this came at the cost of a downgrade of the United States credit
worthiness for the first time in history.11 Unfortunately, however, the resolu-
tion of the August 2011 debt crisis cut short the constitutional debate con-
cerning the President’s authority to unilaterally raise the debt ceiling.12
Despite the political and financial consternation, and debt downgrade, fol-
lowing this initial crisis, Congress has undergone additional debt ceiling cri-
ses—most recently with the Concurrent Resolution that re-opened the
government following a sixteen-day shutdown and suspended the debt ceil-
ing through February 2014.13 This past February, however, Congress suc-
cessfully suspended the debt ceiling until 2015 with limited fanfare; this was
due primarily to internal divides within the Republican Party in the weeks
prior to default that forced Speaker Boehner to rely on Democratic votes to
approve the debt ceiling suspension.14 In order to prevent any future debt
crises or political gamesmanship associated with raising the debt ceiling, a
more thorough understanding of the Public Debt Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the constitutional impossibility of default, is necessary.
This article begins with an analysis of the history of the development of
the debt ceiling and how its use in the legislative process has caused conten-
tious political discourse—culminating in the Debt Ceiling Debate of summer
opinion/08tribe.html, archived at http://perma.cc/HL7K-E77G (stating the arguments for the
constitutionality of a unilateral action by the President to raise the debt ceiling are unsound).
9 David Jackson, Obama says he can’t raise debt ceiling on his own, USA TODAY (July 22,
2011, 5:30 PM), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/theoval/post/2011/07/obama-
speaks-at-university-of-maryland/1#.T7Og_L8eDyA, archived at http://perma.cc/ZJS6-GSML
(“[Obama] said, ‘I have talked to my lawyers . . . [t]hey’re not persuaded that [the constitu-
tionality of the President unilaterally raising the debt ceiling] is a winning argument.’”).
10 Jennifer Steinhauer, Debt Bill Signed, Ending Crisis and Fractious Battle, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 3, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/03/us/politics/03fiscal
.html?pagewanted=all, archived at http://perma.cc/T4LH-3C2Y. The crisis was averted with
the passage of the Budget Control Act of 2011, which President Obama signed into law on
August 2, 2011. Id.; Pub. L. No. 112–25, 125 Stat. 240 (codified in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.). See also infra Part II.
11 Binyamin Appelbaum & Eric Dash, S.&P. Downgrades Debt Rating of U.S. For The
First Time, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/
06/business/us-debt-downgraded-by-sp.html, archived at http://perma.cc/5ZWG-J24U.
12 A search on the Social Science Research Network has returned only a handful of work-
ing papers on the unconstitutionality of the debt ceiling, and the Public Debt Clause more
generally, since enactment of the Budget Control Act of 2011. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz,
Train Wrecks, Budget Deficits, and the Entitlements Explosion: Exploring the Implications of
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Public Debt Clause (The George Washington University Law
School Public Law and Legal Theory Paper No. 575, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=1874746, archived at http://perma.cc/99M4-PCN3; see also Jacob Charles,
The Debt Limit and The Constitution: How the Fourteenth Amendment Forbids Fiscal Obstruc-
tionism, 62 DUKE L. J. 1227 (2012).
13 Jonathan Weisman & Ashley Parker, Shutdown is Over, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2013, at
A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/17/us/congress-budget-debate.html?_r=0,
archived at http://perma.cc/X3AS-EGW3.
14 Burgess Everett & Manu Raju, Senate passes debt ceiling bill, POLITICO (Feb. 12, 2014,
11:13 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/02/senate-debt-ceiling-vote-103437
.html?hp=t1, archived at http://perma.cc/F8T5-YSTL.
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2011 which established the current structure of debt ceiling legislation.15
This current system—the “McConnell Mechanism”—as discussed below,
creates a system where default is theoretically possible following a Congres-
sional veto override.16 However, this article illustrates that default is in fact
constitutionally impossible for three distinct reasons: (1) the Public Debt
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevents the government from default-
ing on its debt—making any law that would allow default thereby unconsti-
tutional; (2) even if the Public Debt Clause allows default, the President’s
Article II powers would authorize a unilateral action increasing the debt ceil-
ing to avoid default following a veto override; and (3) Congress suing as an
institution is both politically infeasible and unconstitutional absent a private
litigant, and any individual, either a Member of Congress or private litigant,
would lack standing to sue the President.17 Therefore, with default being
constitutionally impossible, in order to improve future budget negotiations,
Congress should accept this fact as axiomatic.18 As discussed below, to re-
move any constitutionally impossible threat of default, Congress should ei-
ther: (1) de-politicize raising the debt ceiling by reinstating the Gephardt
Rule; (2) delegate the power to raise the debt ceiling to the President by
making the “McConnell Mechanism” permanent law; or (3) ideally, repeal
the debt ceiling indefinitely. Doing so would be in line with the Constitution,
and would improve future political discourse.
II. HISTORY OF THE DEBT CEILING STATUTE
The Constitution gives Congress the power to spend federal dollars to
“provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the United States”
and to “borrow Money on the credit of the United States” as a means of
funding.19 However, the Constitution does not provide specific guidance to
Congress as to how it should borrow, nor does it impose any regulations or
limitations upon its borrowing measures.20 As such, pursuant to the constitu-
tional decree that each body shall set their own rules of conduct,21 Congress
has developed various means of exercising this power.22 Initial Congres-
sional philosophy towards incurring debt was driven by a desire to promote
sound financial principles, and the debt ceiling was originally intended to
emphasize fiscal restraint while ensuring the validity of the national debt.23
However, partisanship and Congresses politically and philosophically di-
vided on the proper size and scope of the federal government have turned the
15 See infra Part II–III.
16 See infra Part III.
17 See infra Part IV.
18 See infra Part IV–V.
19 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1–2.
20 See id.
21 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
22 See infra Part II.B–E.
23 See infra Part II.B.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\51-2\HLL203.txt unknown Seq: 5 29-MAY-14 7:41
2014] In The Debt We Trust 245
debt ceiling into a political tool, contrary to its original purpose.24 At various
times however, through alterations to House rules, or passage of deficit re-
duction legislation, Congress has been able to minimize the impact partisan
politics has had on the debt ceiling and questions of national default and in
fact reduce the national deficit.25 However, none of these measures address
the core problem of the national debt—that defaulting on it is constitution-
ally impossible.26
A. In the Early Years of the Republic, Issuing Federal Debt
was Limited and Well Regulated
The United States incurred a heavy debt fighting the Revolutionary
War.27 In 1789, the young nation had incurred a debt of $78 million—$18
million of which came from federal assumption of state bonds, and the re-
maining $60 million from the existing national debt.28 This indebtedness was
naturally exacerbated by the inability of the federal government to raise rev-
enue under the Articles of Confederation.29 Saddled with this initial debt, the
United States conscientiously set out on a course to raise revenues through
various taxes and tariffs and limited its use of issuing debt to times of abso-
lute necessity, such as times of war.30 When such occurrences would arise,
Congress passed individual pieces of legislation authorizing new taxes, or
granted the Secretary of the Treasury short-term powers to issue debt via
various bonds or other financial instruments.31 Once the necessity ceased,
Congress would again continue on a course of deficit reduction and work
24 See infra Part II.C–E.
25 See infra Part II.D–E.
26 See infra Part IV.
27 Anita S. Krishnakumar, In Defense of the Debt Limit Statute, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
135, 140 (2005).
28 Id. at 140 n.23.
29 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 30, at 184 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (discussing the failures of the Articles of Confederation, stating “that there must be
interwoven, in the frame of the government, a general power of taxation, in one shape or
another”).
30 See Krishnakumar, supra note 27, at 140–42 (discussing how, once Congress retired the R
Revolutionary War debt, it did not incur another debt until the War of 1812, and debts only
incurred at times of national crisis such as the 1836 National Bank crisis, the Mexican Ameri-
can War of 1847, the Civil War, and World War One in 1917). However, it should be noted
that Federalist, and Treasury Secretary, Alexander Hamilton was an early supporter of having
the nation incur a national debt to fund its spending programs. See ALEXANDER HAMILTON,
REPORT ON MANUFACTURES (1791), reprinted in 2 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 446–47
(Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds. 1987). (“But though a funded debt is not in the first
instance, an absolute increase of [c]apital, or an augmentation of real wealth; yet by serving as
a [n]ew power in the operation of industry, it has within certain bounds a tendency to increase
the real wealth of a [c]ommunity, in like manner as money borrowed by a thrifty farmer, to be
laid out in the improvement of his farm may, in the end, add to his [s]tock of real riches”).
Nevertheless, Hamilton’s support for use of the debt was tempered by a desire to not let the
debt get too high. Id. (“The debt too may be swelled to such a size, as that the greatest part of
it may cease to be useful as a [c]apital.”).
31 Krishnakumar, supra note 27, at 143. R
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towards pairing down the national debt—driven largely by high Republican
tariffs.32 These new taxes and spending cuts were so successful that from the
end of the Civil War to the turn of the century, the United States ran a fiscal
year surplus almost half of the time.33 However, with the growth of industry
and the nation itself, and U.S. involvement in World War One, a change
from this ad hoc approach to debt legislation became necessary so as to
allow continued funding of ever growing public expenditures without the
need of continually passing legislation authorizing the issuance of more and
different debt instruments.34
B. In 1917 Congress Passed the Second Liberty Bond Act
which Created the Debt Ceiling
The rise of national industry, heavy U.S. involvement in World War
One, and other growing financial obligations caused Congress in 1917 to
alter the structure of debt legislation.35 Instead of authorizing individual
spending provisions, or passing certain bond measures on an ad hoc basis,
Congress, in the Second Liberty Bond Act of 1917,36 delegated the power to
issue federal debt instruments to the Secretary of the Treasury to take any
measures necessary to finance national obligations up to a certain limit—
hence the creation of the “debt ceiling.”37 The operative language of the Act
states:
[T]he Secretary of the Treasury, with the approval of the Presi-
dent, is hereby authorized to borrow, from time to time, on the
credit of the United States for the purposes of this Act, and to meet
expenditures authorized for the national security and defense and
other public purposes authorized by law, not exceeding in the ag-
gregate $7,538,945,460 and to issue therefore bonds of the United
States.38
Thus, the Act completely altered the structure of how Congress funded its
operations. As opposed to continuously keeping track of every dollar spent,
Congress was now free to focus on passing legislation to provide for the
nation’s growing needs without concern for specifically how it would be
funded. Instead, the obligation to keep track of the nation’s finances was
henceforth delegated to the Secretary of the Treasury, under defined con-
32 Id. at 142–43.
33 Id. at 142 (stating how “from 1866 to 1894, Congress ran eighteen straight surpluses”)
(citing U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL
TIMES TO 1970 1118 (1976)).
34 See infra Part II.B.
35 Krishnakumar, supra note 27, at 143–44. R
36 Second Liberty Bond Act, Pub. L. No. 65–43, § 1, 40 Stat. 288, 288 (1917).
37 Id.
38 Id.
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straints.39 The Secretary of the Treasury’s borrowing authority was limited by
a requirement that annual reports be submitted to Congress on the expendi-
tures made in the immediately prior Fiscal Year.40 In subsequent years, Con-
gress began a tradition that continues to this day—amending the maximum
limit the Secretary of the Treasury can borrow, or “raising the debt ceiling,”
so as to continue to meet the nation’s growing financial obligations.41
In the interim period between World War One and the Great Depres-
sion, while the Second Liberty Bond Act of 1917 remained in full force, the
nation returned to the tradition of limited use of federal borrowing and an
emphasis on paring down the deficit.42 These efforts were aided by the pas-
sage of the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921,43 which requires the execu-
tive branch to submit a proposed annual budget to Congress via the Bureau
of the Budget (now the Office of Management and Budget) and the General
Accounting Office (now the Government Accountability Office).44 Prospec-
tively, while Congress had the ability to pay for any new government pro-
gram by raising the debt ceiling, it was henceforth theoretically limited to
spending guidelines set forth in a holistic annual budget presented by the
President, as well as an institution dedicated to the oversight and administra-
tion of Congressional expenditures.45
However, with the onset and continuation of the Great Depression, fol-
lowed immediately by the outbreak of World War Two, there was a natural
rise in popular support for Keynesian economic theory, which calls for in-
creased public spending, New Deal social programs, and increased military
spending. Collectively, this legislative agenda made it implausible for the
nation to maintain a balanced budget.46 In order to ensure continued funding
for the various new federal programs, in 1941 Congress amended the debt
ceiling statute to create one uniform, aggregated limit for all forms of U.S.
debt, instead of having limits on each individual type of obligation issued by
the Treasury Department.47 This uniform approach allowed Congress to more
easily administer the multitude of new federal programs without concern for
how to fund each individual program, or which specific debt obligations
could be sold to the public.48
39 Id.
40 Id. at § 10.
41 See infra Part II.B.1–E. See also Krishnakumar, supra note 27, at 145–46 (discussing R
later statutes passed by Congress which amended the Second Liberty Bond Act of 1917 by
increasing the debt limit).
42 Id.
43 Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67–13, 42 Stat. 20 (1921).
44 Id. at §§ 201, 207, 301.
45 See id.
46 Krishnakumar, supra note 27, at 147. R
47 Public Debt Act of 1941, Pub. L. No. 77–7, § 2, 55 Stat. 7 (1941).
48 Id.
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C. Debt Legislation and Congressional (Lack of) Oversight From
World War Two to the Modern Era
Following World War Two, a reduction in military spending limited the
rate at which the national debt grew. However, continued support for expen-
sive New Deal and Great Society programs has limited Congress’s ability, or
desire, to maintain a balanced budget or budget surplus.49 Instead, Congress,
while diligent to not let the federal debt become too high, has historically
been willing to rely on borrowing as a means of funding its various
programs.50
This willingness, however, has not been without its limitations. High
spending throughout the 1960’s due to Cold War military arms spending, the
space program, a rising population, and the implementation of Medicare and
Medicaid, led to fiscal policy debates in Congress.51 During this time,
Republicans and their conservative counterparts amongst the Southern mem-
bers of the Democratic Party would frequently threaten non-extension of the
debt ceiling as a means of curbing high spending and expansive government
programs.52 Thus, in order to restrain spending while also funding federal
programs, Congress took two measures to ensure a more uniform approach
to federal budgeting and debt issuance. First, Congress passed the Congres-
sional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. Second, Congress
adopted the “Gephardt Rule” as a standing rule of the House of
Representatives.53
D. Congress Passed the Congressional Budget and Impoundment
Control Act of 1974 and the “Gephardt Rule”
to Minimize Debt Debate
The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (the
“Budget Act of 1974”) established the Congressional Budget Office, a
Committee on the Budget in both chambers, and focused the appropriations
process.54 Collectively, this centralization of the budget process allowed
Congress to address spending measures more holistically—preventing dupli-
cative and highly leveraged federal programs, while limiting the role of the
49 Krishnakumar, supra note 27 at 148–49. R
50 Id.
51 See CONGRESS AND THE NATION: 1969–1972 64 (Robert A. Diamond ed., 3d ed. 1973).
52 Id.
53 Bill Heniff, Jr., Developing Debt-Limit Legislation: The House’s “Gephardt Rule”, in
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE U.S.: COMMITTEES, RULES AND PROCEDURES, 1 (Helen K.
Larsson & Alonzo P. Vessler, eds., 2009).
54 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93–344, 88
Stat. 297 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.).
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debt ceiling in legislative debate.55 While opponents of the Budget Act of
1974 criticize it as a means of increasing the emphasis on party politics in
Congress, and limiting robust floor debate,56 the Act, coupled with the adop-
tion of the “Gephardt Rule,” which changed the procedure for raising the
debt ceiling, properly altered the mindset of members of Congress. By
amending Congressional procedures, the budgeting process became a “nec-
essary . . . evil” and not a catalyst for a floor fight.57
The “Gephardt Rule” allows for the debt ceiling to be raised without a
vote on the measure and considers the House to have approved an increase
(and thereby to have sent it to the Senate for approval) if the House passes a
budget resolution requiring a higher debt limit than the one currently in ef-
fect.58 Thus, for example, suppose the debt ceiling has been reached, and the
House were to pass a $2 trillion budget—$1 trillion of which coming from
tax revenues. Under the Gephardt Rule, the House would not need to take a
separate vote raising the debt by $1 trillion.59 This allowed raising the debt
ceiling to be a secondary issue and not an opportunity for contentious floor
debate.60 The Gephardt Rule, named after former Democratic Majority
Leader Dick Gephardt from Missouri, was initially implemented in 1979 and
was a standing rule of the House until 1995 when Republicans gained the
majority.61
To complement the streamlined budget process, in 1983, Congress
made all increases to the debt ceiling permanent—Congress could no longer
raise the debt ceiling for a temporary period of time to accommodate short-
term spending.62 This action further limited partisan gridlock and threats of
default.63 However, even though these various measures were designed to
focus Congress’s attention on responsibly reducing spending, and not fight-
ing over debt generally, Congressional spending continued to increase—
leading to a return to, and exacerbation of, a conservative emphasis on fiscal
responsibility in American political discourse for the last thirty years.64
55 See Louis Fisher, War and Spending Prerogatives: Stages of Congressional Abdication,
19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 7, 36–37 (2000) (discussing the intent of the drafters of the
Budget Act of 1974 to encourage a responsible budget process).
56 See Elizabeth Garrett, The Congressional Budget Process: Strengthening the Party-In-
Government, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 702, 715–18 (2000) (stating how the Budget Act of 1974
has politicized the budget process).
57 Krishnakumar, supra note 27, at 153. R
58 Heniff, Jr. supra note 53. R
59 See id.
60 See id. and accompanying text.
61 Kevin Mahnken, Dick Gephardt, Where Art Thou?, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 9, 2013),
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/115084/dick-gephardt-rule-how-he-could-have-avoided-
debt-crisis, archived at http://perma.cc/7TEZ-K2GG.
62 Act of May 26, 1983, Pub. L. No. 98–34, 97 Stat. 196 (1983).
63 See Krishnakumar, supra note 27, at 154 (“Elimination of the temporary ceiling was R
designed to ease political pressures associated with the debt limit by reducing the number and
frequency of debt limit votes.”).
64 Id. at 154–57.
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E. Debt Debate in the Age of Polarized Parties
By the mid-1980’s Congress was unable to limit the perpetual growth of
the federal debt; continued spending on entitlement programs and tax cuts
resulted in the need to raise the debt ceiling. In fact, the national debt in-
creased threefold from 1981 to 1990—going from $994.8 billion to $3.21
trillion.65 To try and limit the need to continually increase the debt ceiling
(indirectly under the Gephardt Rule in the House) and to take on a large
debt, in 1985 Congress passed the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Reduc-
tion Act (GRH).66 A bi-partisan measure, GRH attempted to alter Congres-
sional culture in order to promote fiscal restraint and balanced budgets by
preemptively setting borrowing limits for the next five fiscal years.67
Although GRH allowed for long-term financial planning, allowing for a
government surplus during the Clinton administration from 1998 to 2000,
the national debt continued to increase during this time.68 Furthermore, this
was not without the Republican-led House ignoring the Gephardt Rule and
requiring a floor debate on raising the debt ceiling. Doing this, and thereby
threatening default, forced President Clinton into accepting large spending
cuts69—culminating in the shutdown of the federal government, and contin-
ued animosity between the parties.70 With the start of the 21st Century, parti-
sanship, and the national debt, have only increased.71 Continued spending on
various entitlements, coupled with drastic increases in military and defense
spending, various stimulus packages, and lower taxes have driven the coun-
try into even deeper debt—placing current CBO national debt estimates at
over $17 trillion.72 In 2011 (and subsequently in 2013) the House Republican
majority again did not adopt the Gephardt Rule as a standing rule of the
House—making the debt ceiling a substantive political debate on the na-
tional debt.73 This debate culminated in the debt ceiling crisis of summer
65 See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 322
(2003).
66 See Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99–177,
99 Stat. 1038 (1985) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 31 & 42 U.S.C.).
67 Id.
68 Krishnakumar supra note 27, at 155. R
69 See e.g., Stephen Gettinger, The Budget: The Debt Ceiling “Hammer,” C.Q. WEEKLY
ONLINE 1400 (May 23, 1995), available at http://library.cqpress.com/cqweekly/WR407905,
archived at http://perma.cc/H6QS-34LK (stating how Speaker Gingrich intended to use the
debt ceiling as a “hammer” forcing President Clinton to accept spending reform).
70 See Krishnakumar, supra note 27, at 156. R
71 See e.g., supra notes 1–3 (discussing how Congress is deeply divided on issues of fed- R
eral spending).
72 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 2014-2024,
17 (2014), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/45010-
breakout-Chapter1.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/N9YD-KZGJ.
73 See e.g., Ezra Klein, House eliminated debt ceiling votes in 1979, THE WASHINGTON
POST (April 11, 2011), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/post/
house-eliminated-debt-ceiling-votes-in-1979/2011/04/13/AFLcQxOE_blog.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/YT22-4JMH.
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201174—leading to the passage of the Budget Control Act,75 which limits
debate on the debt ceiling,76 as well as initial discussion of the potential
unconstitutionality of defaulting on debt obligations.77 While the various
statutes discussed above—beginning with the Second Liberty Bond Act of
1917 and ending with the Budget Control Act of 2011—all streamline the
budget process and minimize the role of the debt ceiling in Congressional
debate, none address the fact that default is constitutionally impossible (ei-
ther due to the Public Debt Clause, the President’s executive powers, or the
lack of any individual with standing to sue). A constitutional analysis of the
impossibility of default is necessary in order to fully implement the goals of
these measures, while ensuring America’s financial security and promoting
bi-partisan budget negotiations.78
III. OUTLINE OF DEBT CEILING PROCEDURES UNDER
THE BUDGET CONTROL ACT OF 2011
The Budget Control Act of 2011 (“BCA” or “the Act”)79 was a “last-
choice option” of House Republicans to avoid default and reach a compro-
mise with the Democratic Senate and White House.80 In exchange for a fu-
ture vote on a Balanced Budget Amendment to the Constitution,
Republicans agreed to debt ceiling increases so long as it is the President,
and not Congress, who causes the country to incur more debt.81 Thus, Con-
gress now has the authority to disapprove an increase in the debt ceiling
executed by the President—not the authority to raise it itself.82 This inver-
sion of traditional debt ceiling procedure, or the “McConnell Mechanism,”
was proposed by Republican Senator, and Minority Leader, Mitch McCon-
nell of Kentucky.83
Specifically, the BCA established a two-step approach to raising the
debt ceiling.84 Although the original “McConnell Mechanism” expired in
2012 per the BCA, in the “No Budget, No Pay Act” of May 2013,85 the
Continuing Resolution which reopened the government in October 2013,86
74 See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text; see also, infra Part III. R
75 Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112–25, 125 Stat. 240 (2011) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 2 & 31 of U.S.C.).
76 See infra Part III.
77 See supra notes 3–8 and accompanying text. R
78 See infra Part IV–V.
79 Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112–25, 125 Stat. 240 (2011) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 2 & 31 of U.S.C.).
80 Recent Legislation, Congress Delegates Power to Raise the Debt Ceiling, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 867, 869 (2012) [hereinafter Recent Legislation].
81 Id.
82 Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112–25, 125 Stat. 240 (2011) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 2 & 31 of U.S.C.).
83 See Recent Legislation, supra note 80, at 869. R
84 Budget Control Act § 301(a).
85 No Budget, No Pay Act, Pub. L. No. 113–3, 127 Stat. 51 (2013).
86 Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 113–46, 127 Stat. 558 (2014).
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and the “Temporary Debt Limit Extension Act” of February 2014,87 Con-
gress extended the “McConnell Mechanism” for prescribed periods of time
as a means of raising the debt ceiling. Specifically, the McConnell Mecha-
nism stipulates that when the federal debt is within a certain amount, the
President is authorized to submit a certification to Congress calling for the
Treasury Secretary to authorize an increase in the debt ceiling.88 Following
this action by the President, the debt limit is immediately increased, and, if
Congress fails to respond within fifty calendar days asserting its disapproval,
then the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to issue additional debt.89
Then, should the national debt again come within a set amount of the new
ceiling, the President can call for a second certification raising the debt
limit.90 If Congress fails to respond within fifteen calendar days, this in-
crease is effectuated.91 As with the first certification, Congress is authorized
to assert its disapproval of the increase in the debt ceiling in the second
round.92 In both the first and second round, Congress would vote against an
increase by passing a “joint resolution of disapproval.”93 To become law—
therefore preventing an increase in the debt ceiling—the resolution requires
the President’s signature, and is subject to a Presidential veto, and a Congres-
sional veto override.94
87 Temporary Debt Limit Extension Act, Pub. L. 113–83, 127 Stat. 540 (2014).





93 Id. The House of Representatives approved such a joint resolution of disapproval,
H.R.J. Res. 99, 103d Cong. (2013) by a vote of 222 to 191 on October 30, 2013.
94 Id; see also U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (allowing an override of a Presidential veto if
two-thirds of both houses of Congress vote to do so). Scholars have suggested that the inver-
sion of power created by the McConnell Mechanism is a violation of horizontal separation of
powers between the branches of the federal government, and the non-delegation doctrine of
Congressional power as established in Clinton v. New York. See Recent Legislation, supra note
80, at 870–74. In Clinton v. New York the Supreme Court held that the Line Item Veto Act was R
unconstitutional because it gave the President legislative powers by authorizing the President
to strike down individual spending measures within a larger bill. 524 U.S. 417, 438 (1998).
The court found presidential striking of specific measures an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power to the President because allowing the President to unilaterally cut spending
measures without Congress voting on them violated the requirement per Art. I, § 7, cl. 2 that
for all bills to become law, they must be presented to the President following passage of both
the House and Senate. Id. Thus, these scholars suggest that allowing the President to unilater-
ally raise the debt ceiling, like the Line Item Veto, is an unconstitutional delegation of legisla-
tive power by Congress to the President. Recent Legislation, supra note 80, at 870–74. R
However, this discussion on the form of the BCA is irrelevant. As discussed below, defaulting
on U.S. debt is unconstitutional—or in the alternative: the President would be authorized to
unilaterally raise the debt through his (or her) exercise of executive powers, and no one indi-
vidual has standing on the issue (practically making it a non-justiciable question). See infra
Part IV. Therefore, potential faults with a measure that seeks to prevent default do not need to
be given extensive attention. Rather, energies should be devoted to substantive efforts to re-
duce the deficit itself.
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IV. WHAT IF CONGRESS OVERRODE A PRESIDENTIAL VETO
UNDER THE MCCONNELL MECHANISM?
Under the current scheme established in the BCA, the United States
would ostensibly go into default following four steps. First, the President
orders the Secretary of the Treasury to issue more debt. Second, a majority
of Congress votes to disapprove the measure. Third, the President vetoes the
legislation asserting Congressional disapproval. Fourth, Congress overrides
the veto with the requisite two-thirds majority vote (thereby assuming defeat
of a Senate filibuster).95 However, as discussed below, default actually oc-
curring is constitutionally impossible for three distinct reasons: (1) a proper
reading of the Public Debt Clause makes defaulting on the national debt
unconstitutional;96 (2) even if default were held to be constitutionally per-
missible, the President would be authorized under Article II to use his execu-
tive powers to unilaterally raise the debt ceiling despite a Congressional veto
override;97 and (3) as a procedural matter, were the President to unilaterally
raise the debt ceiling (even if the Court were to hold the President’s action to
be unconstitutional), there would be no individual, or set thereof, that would
have standing to bring suit against the President.98 For these reasons, use of
the debt ceiling as a means of obtaining political favor, or as a means of
kidnapping the legislative agenda, should not be used as doing so would be a
constitutionally fruitless exercise. Instead, members of Congress should take
the nation’s inability to default as axiomatic and in that mindset work to-
wards responsibly reducing the deficit and promoting the general welfare
without discussion of potentially letting the nation default. Focusing on debt
and deficit reductions would restore American credit and market confidence
in federal debt obligations, which in turn would allow for a greater sense of
comity and decorum in our political discourse.99
A. A Proper Reading of § 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment Requires a
Broad Interpretation of the Clause, with
Perpetual Future Application
Written in simple, and broad-sweeping, language, § 4 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Public Debt Clause, states: “The validity of the public debt
of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for pay-
ment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or
rebellion, shall not be questioned.”100 Adopted in the wake of the Civil War,
the Framers of the Amendment were focused not only on the short-term
95 See Budget Control Act § 301(a).
96 See infra Part IV.A.1.
97 See infra Part IV.B.1.
98 See infra Part IV.C.1.
99 See infra Part V.
100 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4.
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difficulties of Reconstruction, but also on their long-term responsibility to
ensure the nation’s future political and financial stability.101 The Supreme
Court of the United States has only considered the Clause once, in Perry v.
United States.102 However, the Court’s reading of the Public Debt Clause’s
broad language suggests support for an expansive interpretation.103 For these
reasons, should the Supreme Court again consider the Public Debt Clause in
the context of a suit brought against the President for unilaterally raising the
debt ceiling despite a Congressional veto override, provided the Court even
reaches the merits of the case,104 the Court would hold the action to be valid
because the Public Debt Clause prevents the United States from defaulting
on its debt.105
1. Understanding the Clause’s Plain Meaning and Historical
Context
Given its plain meaning, the Public Debt Clause would not only make
default impermissible, but also any measure or action which “question[s]”
or undermines its “validity” as well.106 The term “validity,” furthermore,
given its plain meaning, is when something is “legally sufficient” or “bind-
ing.”107 Therefore, even if the nation were to not default on its debt, if a law
would make it possible for a default, the debt would not be “legally suffi-
cient,” and, as such, would violate the Public Debt Clause.108 As suggested
by Michael Abramowicz, the Clause’s passive construction—reading “the
validity of the public debt shall not be questioned”109—instead of an active
sentence structure such as “the public debt’s validity shall not be ques-
tioned”—suggests it was the intent of the Framers to not limit the actor who
“question[s]” the public debt to Congress, or an agent of the federal gov-
ernment, but rather, any individual—thereby ensuring that private individu-
als honor the validity of U.S. debt when it is traded in the secondary
market.110 Such a sentence structure illustrates that it was the Framer’s intent
not merely to set a “technical rule barring failure to make debt payments,”
but rather to announce, “a general principle of debt validity” as a means of
ensuring the public of the nation’s financial strength, as well as the security
of investing in federal bonds.111
101 See infra Part IV.A.1.
102 Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935).
103 See infra Part IV.A.2.
104 See infra Part IV.C.
105 See infra Part IV.A.1–2.
106 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4.
107 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1690 (9th ed. 2009).
108 See Abramowicz, supra note 12, at 24–25. R
109 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4.
110 See Abramowicz, supra note 12, at 24–25. R
111 Id. at 25.
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The Framers were not only concerned, however, with ensuring “a gen-
eral principle of debt validity,”112 but rather, a greater commitment to future
political stability. Following the politically destabilizing Civil War, the Re-
construction Congress was fully committed to ensuring the Union was se-
cure, both economically and politically. Some have argued the Clause
applies only to the war debt it explicitly mentions, which can be supported
by the limited legislative history of the Clause.113 However, if the Recon-
struction Congress was only concerned with protecting the validity of the
Civil War debt, it would have been much easier to pass a statute with limited
language explicitly addressing war debts, as opposed to amending the Con-
stitution to address a debt that would inevitably be retired before the demise
of the nation itself.114 Therefore, the Public Debt Clause’s placement in the
Fourteenth Amendment—which has long been read broadly, so as to secure
the fundamental rights the Union sought to protect—illustrates a greater
commitment to ensuring long-term political, as well as financial, stability.115
The Civil War left the nation, which at the time was dedicated to conserva-
tive fiscal principles, with a large national debt—making the nation’s future
financial stability (and its political implications) a primary concern of the
Reconstruction Congress.116 As Phanor J. Eder stated, it was the “intention
[of the Framers] to lay down a constitutional canon for all time in order to
protect and maintain the national honor [while] strengthen[ing] the national
credit.”117 To the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, protecting the na-
tional debt was not an end itself; it was a means of protecting political stabil-
ity as well.
A debt ceiling is not necessarily prima facie unconstitutional because it
can be used, as it was originally intended, as a means of ensuring debt valid-
ity by imposing fiscal restraints.118 Furthermore, it does not necessarily cause
112 Id.
113 Id. at 7. No member of either the House of Representatives or the Senate entered any
official comment into the Congressional Record during consideration of the Public Debt
Clause. Id. This limited history caused Arthur Nussbaum to suggest that the Clause “does not
seem to proclaim a principal [sic] of legal philosophy” but simply a solution to “a particular
situation existing at the time of its enactment.” Arthur Nussbaum, Comparative and Interna-
tional Aspects of American Gold Clause Abrogation, 44 YALE L.J. 53, 85 (1934). No support-
ing citations on that point, however, were provided. Id.
114 Amending the Constitution requires a proposal by either two-thirds of all Senators and
Representatives, or two-thirds of all state legislators calling for a “Convention for proposing
amendments,” as well as ratification of the proposed amendment by three-fourths of the
States. U.S. CONST. art. V. This process is clearly more time consuming, and difficult, than
simply having a majority of Congress approve a bill and having the President sign it. As such,
had the Reconstruction Congress only been concerned with protecting the Civil War debt,
using language to explicitly limit the Clause’s application to war debt would have been the
much simpler solution.
115 See infra Part IV.A.3.
116 See supra Part II (discussing how, following the Civil War, Congress worked diligently
to reduce the debt).
117 Phanor J. Eder, A Forgotten Section of the Fourteenth Amendment, 19 CORNELL L.Q. 1,
15 (1933).
118 See e.g., Abramowicz, supra note 12, at 38. R
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default provided tax revenues in both the short-term and long-term exceed
liabilities, and Congress’s fiscal policies are committed to servicing its debt
prior to making new expenditures.119 However, a debt ceiling is contrary to
the spirit of the Fourteenth Amendment as it creates the opportunity for indi-
viduals to undermine the nation’s political, as well as its financial, stability
by allowing the debt to be “questioned”120 when the debt ceiling is used as a
political bargaining chip.121 The broad language, passive structure, and plain
meaning of the words of the Public Debt Clause all suggest that a proper
reading requires its application for debts of the United States both existing at
the time of enactment and all future debts. However, such a reading also
demands that its application is not only limited to an actual default, but also
a threat thereof so as to ensure both financial and political stability. This
reading is further supported in the context of the Supreme Court’s holding in
the 1935 Gold Clause case Perry v. United States122—the one and only time
the Court has analyzed the Public Debt Clause—where the Court held the
government could not unilaterally alter the terms of its bonds after
issuance.123
2. The Supreme Court’s Public Debt Clause Jurisprudence in Perry
v. United States
Perry v. United States is the first, and so far, the only, case concerning
the Public Debt Clause heard by the Supreme Court.124 The plaintiff in Perry
purchased a security issued by the federal government that stipulated the
bondholder, upon maturation, would be paid the stated principal and interest
in United States gold coin.125 However, during the Great Depression Con-
gress declared payment in gold or other specie to be against public policy
because of the rapid appreciation of the price of gold. Therefore, Congress
altered the initial terms of the bond instrument Perry purchased, and stated
that holders would be paid in fiat currency instead of gold coin.126 Perry sued
claiming he was entitled to receive the promised amount of gold coin, or, in
the alternative, an amount of fiat currency equivalent to the then value of the
dollar based off of “the change in the weight of the dollar”—roughly $1.69
for every $1.00 of the face value of the bond.127 The Supreme Court held for
Perry—stating it was unconstitutional for Congress to unilaterally alter the
119 Id.
120 See supra Part II.B–E (discussing how the debt ceiling, and threats of non-extension,
have been used by Republicans to force spending cuts).
121 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4.
122 Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935).
123 See infra Part IV.A.2.
124 See e.g., Rosen, supra note 8. R
125 Perry, 294 U.S. at 347.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 358.
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terms of its debt obligations.128 In so holding that Congress could not alter
the terms of its bonds after issuance, the Court relied on the Public Debt
Clause, stating:
While this provision was undoubtedly inspired by the desire to put
beyond question the obligations of the Government issued during
the Civil War, its language indicated a broader connotation. We
regard [the Public Debt Clause] as confirmatory of a fundamental
principle, which applies as well to the government bonds in ques-
tion, and to others duly authorized by the Congress, as to those
issued before the Amendment was adopted.129
The Court was clear in its holding that while Congress certainly has “an
unqualified power” to issue debt on its own terms, once a “contractual obli-
gation” is made, like any private contract, it is “binding upon the conscience
of the sovereign”—making it impossible for the United States to alter the
terms of its obligations by paying less (or none) of the previously promised
amount of money.130
As the Court illustrated in Perry, it is a “fundamental principle” that
the United States will not default on any of its debt obligations in order to
ensure the nation remains financially, and therefore politically, stable.131 To
the Court in Perry, the Clause’s phrasing “‘the validity of the public debt’ as
embracing whatever concerns the integrity of . . . public obligation” illus-
trates its expansive application and purpose of maintaining long-term na-
tional fiscal stability.132 This is necessary because allowing Congress to alter
the terms of its debt obligations after the fact would equate the constitutional
authority of Congress to “borrow money on the credit of the United States
. . . [to] a vain promise; a pledge having no other sanction than the pleasure
and convenience of the pledgor” and not an assurance of the ability to actu-
ally repay.133 For these reasons, “Congress [cannot] alter or repudiate the
substance of its own engagements when it has borrowed money under the
authority which the Constitution confers” because doing so would prevent
U.S. debt instruments from having any market value, hamper U.S.
creditworthiness, limit Congress’s future ability to borrow, and create, in
every way, an unstable regime.134 This sweeping language used by the Court,
in dictum, suggests that it would apply this same logic to any question of the
nation’s debt obligations, or “whatever concerns the integrity of . . . public
obligations.”135 Lower courts have declined to apply the Public Debt Clause
128 Id. at 354.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 353–54.
131 Id. at 354.
132 Id. (emphasis in original).
133 Id. at 351 (emphasis in original) (internal quotations omitted).
134 Id. at 351.
135 Id. at 354.
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in a narrow series of cases when the Department of Education, as authorized
by statute, withheld payments to third parties following their non-compli-
ance with grant requirements;136 in two of these cases the courts asserted the
Clause should apply only to bond debt.137 Because these cases involved a
situation where private actors failed to comply with their contractual obliga-
tions, and not a situation where the government did not honor its debt obli-
gations, these cases did not overturn Perry— “suggesting that it remains
good law.”138
Ultimately, however, the Court did not award damages to Perry—not
because he did not suffer a constitutional injury, but rather, because his pre-
cise injuries were incalculable.139 In Perry, the Court held that it was impos-
sible to determine the plaintiff’s injuries, as there was no longer a market for
gold coin—the payment demanded.140 This is not to suggest, however, that if
the United States were to not honor one of its debt obligations, the individual
in question would not have standing to sue. Courts have long held the au-
thority to issue a mandamus to require federal officials to honor contracts
and obligations previously negotiated by the government, as held in Kendall
v. U.S. ex rel. Stokes.141 Thus, if the Treasury Department withheld payment
on bonds and a bondholder of a $100 bond sued, they would be able to
recover the $100 because the government must honor its debt obligations,
and the bondholder’s injuries are clearly calculable.142 Therefore, should the
Court grant certiorari to hear another Public Debt Clause case, it should and
could sustain, and expand, its holding in Perry to apply to all debt
obligations.143
The spirit of Perry is that the nation’s debt obligations are sacrosanct,
and any action cannot alter existing obligations.144 Therefore, the nation can-
not go into default if the debt ceiling is lower than the nation’s debt obliga-
tions—making a Congressional veto override under the BCA
136 See Great Lakes Higher Educ. Corp v. Cavazos, 911 F.2d 10, 12 n.1, 17 (7th Cir. 1990)
(finding the Clause applies “when some state or federal government agency questions a debt”
but denied application because the Secretary of Education was given the statutory authority to
deny payment if the recipient was non-compliant); see generally Ohio Student Loan Comm’n
v. Cavazos, 900 F.2d 894 (6th Cir. 1990); Colorado v. Cavazos, Civ. A. No. 88-C-207, 1990
WL 367621 at *5 (D. Colo. Aug. 21, 1990); Delaware v. Cavazos, 723 F. Supp. 234 (D. Del.
1989), aff’d, 919 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1990).
137 Colorado v. Cavazos, Civ. A. No. 88-C-207, 1990 WL 367621 at *5 (D. Colo. Aug. 21,
1990); Delaware v. Cavazos, 723 F. Supp. 234, 245 (D. Del. 1989), aff’d, 919 F.2d 137 (3d
Cir. 1990).
138 Abramowicz, supra note 12, at 14. R
139 Id. at 358.
140 Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 357 (1935) (“The discontinuance of gold pay-
ments and the establishment of legal tender currency on a standard unit of value with which all
forms of money of the United States were to be maintained at a parity had a controlling
influence upon the domestic economy. It was adjusted to the new basis. A free domestic mar-
ket for gold was non-existent.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
141 37 U.S. 524, 532–33 (1838).
142 See id.
143 See supra Part IV.A.1–2.
144 See supra notes 125–135 and accompanying text. R
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unconstitutional because it would necessarily “question[ ]” 145 the nation’s
debt, and cause the nation to alter the terms of its payment obligations.146
This reading of the Public Debt Clause is further strengthened when it is
read in the context of the entire Fourteenth Amendment, and the Court’s
jurisprudence on the Amendment.147
3. A Broad Reading of the Public Debt Clause Complies with the
Court’s Broad Reading of Other Sections of the Fourteenth
Amendment
In the Slaughter-House Cases148 the Court initially limited the Four-
teenth Amendment to its context of the Civil War, which was primarily con-
cerned with protecting the rights of former slaves.149 However, over time, the
Court has read § 1 of the Amendment broadly by applying it to all American
citizens—much like the broad reading of § 4 in Perry. The Equal Protection
Clause was held to not just apply to African-Americans in Santa Clara
County v. Southern Pacific R.R.,150 and it has later been used to secure the
rights of women,151 homosexuals,152 voting rights,153 as well as the assurance
of desegregated public schools.154 Similarly, the Due Process Clause has
been vital to securing the fundamental rights of all citizens—including rights
guaranteeing access to an abortion without an “undue burden,”155 refusal of
medical care,156 and intimate association157 as rooted in the essential right to
privacy in the Constitution.158
145 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4.
146 See supra notes 125–135 and accompanying text. R
147 See infra Part IV.A.3.
148 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
149 Id. at 37 (“[T]he main purpose of [the Fourteenth Amendment] was the freedom of
the African race, the security and perpetuation of that freedom, and their protection from the
oppressions of the white men who had formerly held them in slavery.”).
150 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886).
151 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 558 (1996) (holding that a male-only, state-
run, higher education facility violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
152 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (holding that a state constitutional amend-
ment in Colorado which would have disallowed a municipality from passing a measure mak-
ing homosexuals a protected class to be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause).
153 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964) (finding that legislative districts had to be
equal, or nearly equal, in population in order to ensure each citizen’s vote was given equal
weight to allow for equal protection of the laws).
154 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that separate educational
facilities based on race are necessarily unequal, and therefore a violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause).
155 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 834 (1992).
156 Cruzan v. Dir., Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 286 (1990) (finding that a
competent individual has a constitutional right to refuse medical care).
157 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (finding that a Texas law criminalizing
private homosexual conduct violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
because the right to privacy within the home is the spirit of the Fourth Amendment).
158 See supra notes 155–157. R
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With the Court applying a broad reading of the more visible provisions
of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is only logical that it would apply the same
expansive understanding to the Public Debt Clause—a clause intended to
ensure the rights of citizens against the government.159 It is incongruous to
suggest that § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment should be read to secure the
rights and equal protection of the laws to all citizens (and not just the newly
freed slaves the Reconstruction Congress was primarily concerned with)
while the remainder of the Amendment—including the Public Debt Clause
of § 4—should be limited in scope and apply only to the Civil War debt.160
In writing the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, the Framers
wanted to protect individual rights of American citizens, and with the Public
Debt Clause, they wanted to protect their financial rights by guaranteeing the
nation’s creditworthiness.161 A narrow reading of § 4 would be incongruous
with the Court’s reading of the remainder of the Amendment. Courts, Con-
gress, and legal scholars have long held the Fourteenth Amendment to re-
present the policy of protecting liberties and legal protections for all
citizens.162 Reading the Public Debt Clause expansively is both a proper
form of statutory interpretation163 and a necessary means of protecting
America’s perpetual financial security. Therefore, a proper reading of the
Public Debt Clause makes defaulting on the national debt unconstitutional.
However, as discussed in the next section, even if the Court were to overturn
Perry, limit its holding, or take any other reading of the Clause which would
allow for default, the President would still likely be authorized to unilater-
ally raise the debt ceiling—despite a Congressional veto override of the veto
of the vote of disapproval under the BCA—given his executive powers
under Article II.164
159 See supra Part IV.B.
160 Cf. United Savings Ass’n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 371
(1988) (“Statutory construction . . . is a holistic endeavor. A provision that may seem ambigu-
ous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme . . . .”).
161 Although it may be argued that the often forgotten § 3 of the Amendment, which de-
nies the right of former rebels to serve in a public post, is limited to ex-Confederates, such a
reading is not compliant with the spirit of the Amendment and the Court’s general jurispru-
dence on it. While the Framers were primarily concerned with the internal conflict of the Civil
War, they did not simply pass individual statutes limiting the rights of Confederates. Instead,
they amended the Constitution—illustrating their desire that the Fourteenth Amendment
should be read broadly so as to prevent all future conflicts as well. Cf. supra Part IV.A.
162 See supra notes 151–157. R
163 See United States v. Boisdore´’s Heirs, 49 U.S. 113, 122 (1850) (“In expounding a
statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the
provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.”); see also FCC v. NextWave Per-
sonal Commc’ns, Inc., 537 U.S. 293, 311 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“It is dangerous . . .
in any case of interpretive difficulty to rely exclusively upon the literal meaning of a statute’s
words divorced from consideration of the statute’s purpose.”).
164 See infra Part IV.B.
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B. The President’s Executive Powers—as Established in Youngstown
and Dames & Moore—Suggest that a Unilateral Action
Raising the Debt Ceiling Would be Authorized as an
Implied Power of the President
Should Congress override the President’s veto of the vote of disap-
proval to raise the debt ceiling, the President would face a set of conflicting
laws. The law under the BCA would prevent an increase in the debt ceiling;
however, without issuing more debt, the nation would not be able to meet its
current financial obligations, as previously appropriated. The President
would need to reconcile this conflict with the constitutional duty that the
President “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”165 Therefore,
should the President unilaterally raise the debt ceiling and ignore the veto
override, he would be acting against the “express[ ] . . . will of Congress”
regarding the debt ceiling. However, by unilaterally raising the debt ceiling,
he would ensure federal programs are properly funded—thereby acting
within the “implied authority” of the President166 to “take Care that the
[previously enacted Congressional appropriations and spending] Laws are
faithfully executed” so as to avoid a national crisis—therefore making the
unilateral debt ceiling increase “authorized by law.”167 This argument is
strengthened when viewed in the international context of securities trading
and the pervasiveness of U.S. debt as an investment in both foreign and
domestic markets.168
1. Analyzing a Unilateral Increase in the Debt Ceiling in the
Context of the Court’s Domestic Executive Powers
Jurisprudence in Youngstown
In Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer the Court held that President
Truman violated constitutional separation of powers when he seized the steel
mills to prevent a strike in order to ensure full support for the Korean War
effort.169 In the now seminal concurrence by Justice Jackson,170 Jackson es-
tablished three broad categories for analyzing the constitutionality of a Presi-
dential action: (1) Presidential power is strongest when the President is
acting in accordance with the (either express or implied) authority granted
165 U.S. CONST., art. II, § 3.
166 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
167 U.S. CONST., art. II, § 3.
168 See infra Part IV.B.2.
169 See 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
170 See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, The Most Dangerous Branch? Mayors, Governors,
Presidents, and the Rule of Law: A Symposium on Executive Power Essays, 115 YALE L.J.
2350, 2354 (2006) (stating that Justice Jackson’s “canonical concurrence” in Youngstown so-
lidified the notion “that executive power operates within a constitutional framework of checks
and balances, resting on the vision of shared institutional powers”).
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by Congress; (2) Presidential power is unclear when the President acts ab-
sent a clear grant or denial of power; and (3) Presidential power is weakest
when he acts against Congress’s (express or implied) grant of authority.171
Under this spectrum, a unilateral action by the President to raise the debt
ceiling following a Congressional veto override would be an act by the Pres-
ident when his power is “at its lowest ebb” because it is incompatible with
the “express[ ] . . . will of Congress” in passing the BCA.172 However,
raising the debt ceiling in this scenario would be necessary to make sure that
the authority previously granted by Congress to the Treasury Department to
make expenditures for the appropriated monies is carried out—making a
unilateral action to raise the debt ceiling an implicit power granted to the
President because the appropriated levels exceed current revenues.173
Raising the debt ceiling does not increase federal spending, nor is it a
means of conditioning current or future spending. Congress creates, and es-
tablishes budgets for, federal programs as well as other expenditures such as
interest payments on debt. These expenditures receive their operating funds
from the United States Treasury, as appropriated by Congress. Funding for
federal appropriations comes from taxation. However, because tax revenues
may be lower than anticipated, or payments are due prior to receipt of tax
revenues, in order to make payments absent available tax dollars, the Trea-
sury Department must issue federal debt to meet this shortfall.174 As such,
strictly speaking, the need to raise the debt ceiling is a question of cash
flows, and not a question of excessive spending. President Clinton in 2011
properly stated that raising the debt ceiling is not a vote “to keep [increas-
ing] deficit spending”; rather, it is a vote “to honor obligations already in-
curred.”175 Certainly, extensive or excessive borrowing is unsustainable.
However, the proper solution to this is to reduce spending or increase taxa-
tion—not to threaten the nation’s creditworthiness over previously appropri-
ated funds. This is because, as Secretary Geithner warned Congress in 2011,
“reductions in future spending commitments cannot supply the short-term
cash needed” to fund current obligations.176
171 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
172 Id.
173 See id. (discussing how a unilateral action by the President to execute a law—even if
the power to do so is not expressly permitted by Congress—may be a valid exercise of Presi-
dential powers).
174 Kasia Klimasinska, Lew Says U.S. Borrowing Power May Not Last Past Feb.
27, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Feb. 7, 2014, 3:52 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-02-
07/lew-says-u-s-borrowing-power-may-not-last-past-feb-27.html, archived at http://perma.cc/6
FDX-3979 (discussing how filings for tax refunds will deplete the Treasury and limit the cash
balance available—forcing the issuance of more debt to fund the nation’s financial
obligations).
175 Jennifer Epstein, Bill Clinton: I’d Use the 14th Amendment, POLITICO (July 19, 2011,
6:25 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0711/59331.html, archived at http://perma
.cc/N8UQ-AFWL.
176 Letter from Timothy Geithner, Sec’y of the Treasury, to Senator Harry Reid (D-NV)
(Apr. 4, 2011), available at http://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Documents/FINAL%20Let
ter%2004-04-2011%20Reid%20Debt%20Limit.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/5PE4-2V2F.
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Therefore, because one law expressly denies Presidential power, and
the other implicitly authorizes it, authority from Congress is unclear—likely
causing the Court to place the action in Justice Jackson’s second category.177
When in this zone, the President would have to choose which law to “faith-
fully execute[ ],”178 and the constitutionality of the President’s power would
“depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables
rather than abstract theories of law.”179 Given the catastrophic effect default-
ing on U.S. national debt would cause in the global financial markets, any
President would likely choose to raise the debt ceiling unilaterally to ensure
continued funding for current public spending programs, as well as the sta-
bility of global financial markets—that being a necessary component of se-
curing the safety and stability of the United States.180 Therefore, because
Congress previously authorized expenditures in excess of current revenues
and debt limits, and the exigencies would call for a prevention of default, a
unilateral action by the President to raise the debt ceiling and fund these
measures would be a constitutional execution of the laws, and not unconsti-
tutional Presidential lawmaking under Justice Jackson’s framework.181
Furthermore, given the importance of U.S. debt in financial markets, a
unilateral increase of the debt ceiling is not only potentially constitutional
under Jackson’s second category, but rather, would be imperative in order to
avoid a national crisis—allowing for Justice Vinson’s dissenting opinion in
Youngstown to provide a relevant point of analysis.182 Justice Vinson argued
that the “leadership contemplated by the Framers” requires the President to
177 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (“[C]ongressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a
practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility.”).
178 U.S. CONST., art. II, § 3.
179 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
180 See supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing the financial crisis a default on R
American debt would cause across various markets).
181 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635–37 (Jackson, J., concurring); see also Rosen, supra
note 8. R
182 See id. at 683 (Vinson, J., dissenting) (discussing the importance, and historic under-
standing, of unilateral action by the President in times of national crisis to be constitutionally
permissible); see also Michael P. Van Alstine, Constitutional Necessity and Presidential Pre-
rogative: Does Presidential Discretion Undergird or Undermine the Constitution?, 45 TULSA
L. REV. 631, 638 (2010) (discussing how scholars have found the “required space for extrale-
gal executive discretion in time of true national crisis.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Certainly, other scholars have, in the light of broad exercises of executive powers in the
George W. Bush administration, called for a return to the strict checks and balances envisioned
by James Madison. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 632 (Jackson, J., concurring). However, the
Madisonian desire to require the President to get authorization in times of crises in the modern
era—given the immediacy of many conflicts—can be properly administered when the Presi-
dent explains why the measures taken were necessary to avoid national crisis, and therefore an
implied Presidential power. See id. at 641–42; see also Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule,
Op-Ed., Obama Should Raise the Debt Ceiling on His Own, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2011, availa-
ble at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/22/opinion/22posner.html?_r=1, archived at http://
perma.cc/B9Y3-V8WZ (“[T]he president would derive authority [to unilaterally raise the
debt ceiling following a Congressional veto override] from his paramount duty to ward off
serious threats to the constitutional and economic system.”).
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“act promptly and resolutely to enforce legislative programs, at least to save
those programs until Congress [can] act” so as to avoid a national crisis.183
While closure of the steel mills would have only impacted the steel mar-
ket—and indirectly slow the war efforts—a default on American debt would
necessarily impact global markets generally, and could cause a global finan-
cial crisis.184 Due to the potential to default, the imperative for the President
to act unilaterally is greater in the context of the national debt when com-
pared to closure of the steel mills. Additionally, unlike in Youngstown where
the Congress could have theoretically acted to ensure continued steel pro-
duction, Congress would not act to save the nation from default because that
would have been its intention in overriding the President’s veto. Therefore,
because Congress would not act to avoid default and ensure continued fund-
ing of current appropriations, the only way “to enforce [the] legislative pro-
grams” would be a unilateral action by the President.185
Outside of taxes, fees, or other regularly scheduled revenues, there are
three hypothetical ways in which the Treasury Department can receive funds.
First, as discussed, the President can unilaterally raise the debt ceiling. Sec-
ond, it can sell federal land, buildings, or gold. And third, the Treasury De-
partment could mint a coin and declare it to be valued at the desired level of
the debt ceiling increase (such as $1 trillion). Selling federal lands and
properties would take too long,186 and selling gold in a “fire sale” would
cause panic in the financial markets and place the value of gold, as well as
countless other public and private assets, at risk of drastic losses.187 Minting
a $1 trillion coin is technically legal under a statute that authorizes the Secre-
tary of the Treasury to mint platinum coins and determine their value.188 This
statute, however, was intended for the production of commemorative
coins189—causing this option to both violate Congressional intention in pass-
ing that statute, while also disrupting horizontal separation of powers by
allowing the President to usurp the Coinage clause. Unilaterally raising the
debt ceiling, however, while arguably against Congress’s will in failing to
raise the debt ceiling, would be in line with Congress’s will in previously
appropriating money, the President’s Constitutional duty to execute existing
laws, and the proper reading of the Public Debt Clause. For these reasons,
unilaterally raising the debt ceiling by the President would be the
183 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 683 (Vinson, J., dissenting).
184 See supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing the financial crisis a default on R
American debt would cause across various markets).
185 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 683 (Vinson, J., dissenting).
186 Terry Pristin, Government, Too, Has Trouble Selling Buildings, N.Y. TIMES, April 27,
2011, at B7.
187 Supra note 176. R
188 31 U.S.C. § 5112 (2012).
189 Leigh Ann Caldwell, What’s up with the $1 trillion coin?, CBS NEWS (Jan. 11, 2013,
6:00 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/whats-up-with-the-1-trillion-coin/, archived at
http://perma.cc/4T8E-8S9N.
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“prompt[ ] and resolute[ ] [leadership] to enforce [not only current] legis-
lative programs” but also our entire Constitutional order.190
Lastly, this understanding of implied Presidential power to unilaterally
raise the debt ceiling is supported both by the importance of U.S. debt in
matters of foreign affairs and by the history of Congress continually granting
more and more power to the executive branch to unilaterally issue debt.191
Thus, as the Court held in Dames & Moore v. Regan with regard to Presi-
dential powers in foreign affairs, with a long history of Congress granting
the President broad powers to unilaterally issue more debt, “there is con-
gressional acquiescence in the conduct of the sort engaged in by the Presi-
dent” and it should therefore be authorized as a constitutional exercise of
Presidential power.192 Therefore, given this history, and the international im-
plications of a national default, the constitutionality of a unilateral action by
the President raising the debt ceiling is further strengthened by the Court’s
analysis in Dames & Moore.193
2. Analyzing the President’s Broad Powers in Foreign Affairs in the
International Context of Federal Spending and Global
Financial Markets
Unlike the threatened mill closures in Youngstown, which would disrupt
the national economy and slow the war effort, defaulting on the federal debt
would have severe economic implications outside domestic borders.194
United States Treasury bonds are a valuable security, and are held by Ameri-
can citizens, as well as foreign nationals, and even foreign governments.195
They likewise are crucial because U.S. government bonds “serve as
benchmarks for quoting and pricing yields on private (credit-risky) securi-
ties” in both domestic and foreign markets.196 Furthermore, U.S. currency
serves as the base international reserve currency for transactions amongst all
nations; making the U.S. dollar, and U.S. debt instruments, a vital compo-
nent of international trade and finance.197 As such, a default on American
190 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 683 (Vinson, J., dissenting).
191 See supra Part II.
192 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678–79, 688 (1981).
193 See infra Part IV.B.2.
194 See supra note 3 (discussing the international implications of a default on American R
debt).
195 See, e.g., Louis Charbonneau, Scrap dollar as sole reserve currency: U.N. report,
REUTERS (June 29, 2010, 4:56 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/06/29/us-dollar-
reserves-un-idUSTRE65S40620100629, archived at http://perma.cc/SCS2-TEFM (noting that
many nations currently use the American dollar as a reserve currency, but are beginning in
recent years to invest in other currencies, following the declining value of the dollar).
196 Garry J. Schinasi, Charles F. Kramer & R. Todd Smith, Financial Implications of the
Shrinking Supply of U.S. Treasury Securities, INT’L MONETARY FUND (Mar. 20, 2001), http://
www1.american.edu/academic.depts/ksb/finance_realestate/mrobe/Library/IMF.pdf, archived
at http://perma.cc/MY9A-7LES.
197 See, e.g., Ruth Judson, Crisis and Calm: Demand for U.S. Currency at Home and
Abroad from the Fall of the Berlin Wall to 2010, FED. RESERVE (Nov. 2012), http://www
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debt would be a matter of foreign affairs—an area the Constitution, and the
Court, has long granted even broader powers to the President than in domes-
tic affairs.198
Certainly, the steel mill closure in Youngstown necessarily implicated
foreign affairs because decreased steel production hampered the Korean War
effort. However, the economic and political consequences of seizing the
mills were primarily felt domestically—making a grant of extensive powers
to the President an unconstitutional exercise of his role as Commander in
Chief. As Justice Jackson stated: “[no] doctrine that the Court could pro-
mulgate would seem to [b]e more sinister and alarming than that a President
whose conduct of foreign affairs is so largely uncontrolled, and often even is
unknown, can vastly enlarge his mastery over the internal affairs of the
country by his own commitment to the Nation’s armed forces.”199
In matters having a greater, and more direct, impact on foreign affairs,
however, the Court has been willing to grant the President greater unilateral
powers. For instance, in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation
the Supreme Court held that the non-delegation doctrine was not violated
when President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued an Executive Order, pursuant
to a Joint Resolution of Congress, banning the sale of arms to parties in-
volved in a Latin American border dispute.200 In so holding, the Court stated
that because the nation requires uniform application of foreign policy, and
the President, as one individual, is better positioned to understand foreign
affairs than Congress, “there [was] sufficient warrant for the broad discre-
tion vested in the President to determine whether the enforcement of the
statute [would] have a beneficial effect upon the re-establishment of peace
in the affected countries.”201
A post hoc application of Justice Jackson’s categories to Curtiss-Wright
clearly illustrates the Court would have placed President Roosevelt’s Execu-
tive Order in the first category because it was issued in pursuance to a Joint
Resolution of Congress.202 However, this is not to suggest that the President
is only given broad executive powers in matters of foreign affairs when he is
acting at the express direction of Congress.203 Nor does it suggest that the
President’s broad authority is limited to questions solely of military conflict
and overt national security.204 In Dames & Moore v. Regan, the Court held
that President Carter did not violate constitutional separation of powers
.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2012/1058/ifdp1058.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/96BZ-7D
GK (stating that “U.S. currency has long been a desirable store of value and medium of ex-
change” in other nations, and that “a substantial share of U.S. currency circulates outside the
United States”).
198 See supra notes 190–197 and accompanying text. R
199 Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 642 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
200 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 327–28 (1936).
201 Id. at 329.
202 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
203 See supra note 198 and accompanying text. R
204 See supra note 198 and accompanying text. R
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when he unilaterally froze Iranian assets in the United States and suspended
American business dealings in Iran, without express Congressional approval,
following the seizure of American personnel at the Embassy in Tehran.205
There the Court held that although there were pieces of legislation that “in-
vited” Presidential power, there was no clear direction from Congress—es-
sentially placing President Carter’s actions on the border of Justice Jackson’s
first and second categories.206 And, in order for the nation’s foreign policy to
be properly executed, it was deemed necessary for the President to have
broad powers to negotiate with foreign leaders, and take quick and decisive
actions to best promote America’s national security and interests in external
affairs.207 As such, because the influence of American debt instruments is
pervasive in all foreign financial markets, making national default a matter
of foreign affairs with the potential to cause international conflict,208 a Presi-
dential action to raise the debt ceiling is akin to Dames & Moore.
President Truman seized the steel mills as Commander in Chief; how-
ever, this action had its greatest consequences in the civilian domestic econ-
omy—forcing the Court to draw limitations on unilateral powers of the
President in order to maintain the power of the legislature to control domes-
tic affairs.209 President Carter’s actions, however, were needed to maintain a
single voice in America’s relations with foreign nations, and had their most
significant impact abroad. Similarly, a unilateral increase in the debt ceiling
would be necessary to avoid an international financial crisis, while also en-
suring that the President is able to carry out his duties to execute the appro-
priations law. This action would have both a greater impact on foreign
affairs, and a lesser impact on domestic matters, than Youngstown—making
a unilateral increase in the debt ceiling to be a constitutional exercise of
Presidential powers.
Much like a freeze on Iranian assets located in the United States was
held to be implicitly authorized by the broad powers in foreign affairs Con-
gress and the Constitution grant to the President, so too would the Presi-
dent’s raising the debt ceiling be held to be implicitly authorized to see that
the nation’s interests are protected abroad. Raising the debt level would be
necessary to see that foreign policy is properly executed by ensuring funding
to foreign programs through the Department of State (e.g.: U.S. AID or the
Peace Corps.), as well as funding for ongoing military conflicts via appropri-
205 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 688 (1981) (“[W]here, as here, the settle-
ment of claims has been determined to be a necessary incident to the resolution of a major
foreign policy dispute between our country and another, and where, as here, we can conclude
that Congress acquiesced in the President’s action, we are not prepared to say that the President
lacks the power to settle such claims.”).
206 Id. at 678–80.
207 Id. at 688.
208 See supra notes 194–195 and accompanying text. R
209 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 644 (1981) (Jackson, J., con-
curring) (“[M]ilitary powers of the Commander in Chief [are] not to supersede representative
government of internal affairs.”).
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ations to the Department of Defense.210 Furthermore, because foreign nation-
als also hold American debt, the pricing of debt instruments across global
markets depends on predictable pricing associated with U.S. debt, and the
role of the U.S. dollar as the recognized primary reserve currency, there is
the potential for new threats to national security arising from the ruinous
global cross-market implications of default.211
Decreased steel production inhibited one component of the military’s
war efforts. Iranian financial assets in America, however, implicated both
America’s position with the Iranian government, as well as its greater role in
the global community. Similarly, a default on U.S. debt would have expan-
sive and severe implications across the globe, while simultaneously hurting
domestic concerns and inhibit the President’s ability to execute the appropri-
ations laws. Therefore a unilateral action by the President to raise the debt
ceiling, and avoid international conflict, would likely be held to be constitu-
tional. However, even if the Court were to theoretically hold otherwise, it
would likely not even be able to reach the merits of the case because it is a
constitutional impossibility for the issue to be justiciable because no one has
standing to challenge the unconstitutionality of the President’s action to uni-
laterally raise the debt ceiling, as discussed below.212
C. Regardless of the Court’s Ruling on the Constitutionality of Default,
or a Unilateral Action by the President, the Matter is Non-Justiciable
Because No Party Has Standing, nor Would the Court
Find the Injuries Redressable
A third and final reason why defaulting on American debt obligations is
constitutionally impossible is a question of procedure, and not a substantive
analysis. To bring suit, a party must have standing under Article III of the
Constitution—the ability to demonstrate they personally and individually
have been injured by the defendant’s actions.213 The Court established a
three-part test for determining standing in Sierra Club v. Morton. A plaintiff
must: (1) suffer “injury in fact” by a material change in her life; (2) there
must be a causal connection between the plaintiff’s injury, and the action(s)
of the defendant(s); and (3) a likelihood that a favorable decision for the
plaintiff will redress the injury in question.214 Under these requirements,
there are only two potential individuals, or sets thereof, that would have
standing to sue the President for unilaterally raising the debt ceiling: (1)
Congress may have “institutional standing” to sue the administration if the
210 Thereby making the unilateral action increasing the debt ceiling a proper execution of
the laws, and not unconstitutional lawmaking. See supra Part IV.B.1.
211 See supra note 194 and accompanying text. R
212 See infra Part IV.C.
213 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution.”).
214 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 736–38 (1972).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\51-2\HLL203.txt unknown Seq: 29 29-MAY-14 7:41
2014] In The Debt We Trust 269
Court extends its prior holdings, and finds this to be a possibility without a
private litigant;215 or, (2) an individual who purchased a credit default swap
(CDS) against U.S. securities may have standing to sue the President be-
cause without the unilateral action to raise the debt ceiling, the nation would
go into default, and the holder would profit.216 However, a Congressional
lawsuit is politically infeasible,217 and the purchaser of a CDS would not
suffer an injury, or alternatively, if the Court were to find a valid injury, it
would neither be clearly caused by the President’s actions, nor would it be
redressable by holding said actions unconstitutional.218
1. Question of “Institutional Standing”
In the 1997 case of Raines v. Byrd the Supreme Court held that a set of
individual members of Congress lacked Article III standing to challenge the
constitutionality of the Line Item Veto Act.219 The Court did not address the
merits of the case, and held, in a 7-2 decision, that the six members lacked
standing because the injury was to Congress as an institution and not to
individual members of Congress.220 The Court stated that if it were to ever
find a member has institutional standing to sue the President, their injury
would need to amount to “vote nullification”—all of plaintiffs’ votes
“would [need to] be[ ] sufficient to pass or defeat a specific bill.”221 Based
on this precedent, the only way for members of Congress, as agents of the
public and not private citizens, to have standing, would be if the institution
of Congress itself were to sue as one entity; without at least two-thirds of
Congress suing following a veto override, the votes of the plaintiffs would
215 See infra Part IV.C.2; see also Matthew Zeitlin, The Debt Ceiling: Why Obama Should
Just Ignore It, NEW REPUBLIC (June 24, 2011), http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/90659/debt-
ceiling-obama-congress, archived at http://perma.cc/W2NX-TV3N (“A joint resolution from
Congress could try to get an injunction from the D.C. District Court to stop the Treasury from
issuing new debt.”). Although there is a history of courts allowing the legislature to be party to
a lawsuit against another branch of the government, those cases involved private litigants,
suggesting the Court may hold that, absent a private litigant with standing, Congress alone, as
a single entity, may not be able to sue the executive branch. See Michael Herz, United States v.
United States: When Can the Federal Government Sue Itself?, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 893,
910–11 (1991).
216 See infra Part IV.C.2. Exclusive of Establishment Clause cases, the Court has long held
that status alone as a taxpayer is insufficient to establish standing. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.
83, 88 (1968).
217 See infra Part IV.C.2.
218 See infra Part IV.C.2.
219 Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 830 (1997) (“We therefore hold that these individual
members of Congress do not have a sufficient ‘personal stake’ in this dispute and have not
alleged a sufficiently concrete injury to have established Article III standing.”).
220 Id. For a discussion of the merits of the case, and how the Court ultimately held the
Line Item Veto Act to violate the Presentment Clause of the Constitution and the non-delega-
tion doctrine, see Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 438 (1998).
221 Raines, 521 U.S. at 822–23; see also JAY R. SHAMPANSKY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL30280, CONGRESSIONAL STANDING TO SUE: AN OVERVIEW (2001), available at http://con
gressionalresearch.com/RL30280/document.php?study=Congressional+Standing+to+Sue+
An+Overview, archived at http://perma.cc/XG23-QA9C.
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be insufficient for injury to amount to “vote nullification.”222 Furthermore,
even if a valid suit were brought against the President by two-thirds of all
legislators in both chambers, in order to hear the merits of the case, the
Court would have to extend institutional standing absent a private litigant.223
In the current Congress, even if the Joint Resolution were to pass the
House, it likely would not pass in the Democratic-led Senate.224 Further-
more, even if the BCA were to be extended permanently to establish the
McConnell Mechanism as the norm for raising the debt ceiling permanently,
and both houses were controlled by the President’s opposition, a vote on
overturning the veto or a Joint Resolution to sue the President would never
be passed (absent reform of Senate rules) because a member of the Presi-
dent’s party in the Senate would filibuster the bill—thereby preventing clo-
ture, and not allowing a final vote.225
In both consideration of the veto override and the Joint Resolution, the
minority party would filibuster every step of the process. First the procedural
vote on the motion to proceed would be filibustered. Then, if cloture were
reached on the motion to proceed, the minority party would filibuster the
vote on final passage. Following a cloture vote on that filibuster which
would set a final vote on the Joint Resolution, the minority party could then
indefinitely delay the vote, as well as all other Senate activity, by simply not
showing up to work. Under Senate Rules, no Senate business can be done in
the absence of a quorum, defined as a majority of the Senate (51 Sena-
tors).226 However, even if every single member of the majority party arrived
to establish a quorum, in order to invoke cloture, the majority party would
need 60 members, and to approve the Joint Resolution, it would need 67
members.227 The political dynamics of the modern era make such a super-
majority a practical impossibility.228 As such, because political realities pre-
vent the majority party from ever holding 67 seats, and therefore unilaterally
222 See Raines, 521 U.S. at 822–23; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
223 See Herz, supra note 215, at 910–11. R
224 Zeitlin, supra note 215. R
225 See id.
226 RICHARD S. BETH & VALERIE HEITSHUSEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL22188, FILI-
BUSTERS AND CLOTURE IN THE SENATE 7 (2013), available at http://www.senate.gov/CRSRe
ports/crs-publish.cfm?pid=%270E,*PLW%3D%22P++%0A, archived at http://perma.cc/
N7XL-W9RZ pg. 9.
227 Id. at 1.
228 Since Alaska and Hawaii joined the union, giving the Senate its current 100 seats, only
in one Congress did the majority party have more than 67 seats; from 1965 to 1967, it had 68.
Dynamics of the time, however, caused parties to not be as partisan-focused as they are today.
Following passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, conservative Southern Democrats joined
the Republican party, and our nation’s political parties became much more partisan. Following
this exodus, the majority party in the Senate has never had more than 61 members. See Party
Division in the Senate, 1789–Present, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/
one_item_and_teasers/partydiv.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/
3LH2-WL5A.
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controlling the Senate, Senate rules practically prevent passage of either a
veto override or passage of a Joint Resolution to sue the President.229
For these reasons, assuming the Court were to extend Raines and allow
for institutional standing absent a private litigant, such a case would remain
impractical given modern political dynamics and Senate rules.230 It is highly
unlikely that the Court would allow only the House of Representatives,
whose rules prevent a filibuster and would force an up-or-down vote on the
Joint Resolution,231 to sue the President.232 Doing so would violate the consti-
tutional requirements of bicameralism; Raines was concerned with the whole
of Congress—not either body individually233—and the Court’s holdings in
other cases suggest that both chambers must act in concert so to best effectu-
ate the Framer’s intent in requiring a bill to pass both the House and Senate
prior to presentment to the President.234 Therefore, while Congress as an in-
stitution may theoretically have standing to sue the President provided the
Court extends its prior holdings, party politics, Senate rules, and the require-
ments of bicameralism, make it an improbability for Congress, or one house
individually, to bring suit—making a private citizen who purchased a CDS
against government debt to be the only practical and potential plaintiff.235
229 Since 1968 Congress has successfully overridden 29.0% of all Presidential vetoes. See
Summary of Bills Vetoed, 1789-present, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/reference/Legisla
tion/Vetoes/vetoCounts.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/5DQR-JV
GZ. None of the measures in which Congress successfully overrode the President’s veto impli-
cated significant issues of America’s financial security. The closest types of measures that were
overridden were appropriations bills; successful overrides of appropriations bills in the modern
era are significantly less common than they were earlier in American history, at 11.6%. See
KEVIN R. KOSAR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL22188, Regular Vetoes and Pocket Vetoes
(2013), available at http://www.senate.gov/CRSReports/crs-publish.cfm?pid=%270DP%2BP,
_3+P++%0A, archived at http://perma.cc/9TD9-UZ9N. Although a veto override of appro-
priations bills carries with it the threat of a government shutdown, it does not implicate a
default on U.S. financial obligations, making a veto override significantly less likely. Lastly, as
has been seen with continued votes to raise the debt ceiling in a Republican-led House with a
Democratic President during and after a government shutdown, a vote implicating default of
the U.S. government is not palatable, even to very conservative Members of Congress. See
supra Part II.
230 See Kosar, supra note 229. R
231 RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES EFFECTIVE FOR ONE HUNDRED AND TENTH
CONGRESS (Jan. 3, 2007) (House Rule XX).
232 See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 830 (1997).
233 Raines, 521 U.S. at 812 (“[T]he Act causes a type of institutional injury which dam-
ages all Members of Congress equally.”).
234 Cf. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 922 (1983) (“When the Framers intended to author-
ize either House of Congress to act alone and outside of its prescribed bicameral legislative
role, they narrowly and precisely defined the procedure for such action in the Constitution.”).
235 See supra notes 213–18 and accompanying text; see also infra Part IV.C.2. R
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2. Question of Standing of a Holder of a CDS against U.S. Debt
A credit default swap is a derivative financial instrument where the
owner gains in an instance of default of the underlying security.236 Thus, an
individual who purchased a CDS against U.S. debt would receive a payout if
the nation were to default—thereby potentially giving the owner standing to
sue the President were the President to unilaterally raise the debt ceiling. The
CDS holder would arguably have standing because the President’s action to
prevent default would deny the CDS holder’s instrument from having market
value.237 However, following a unilateral increase of the debt ceiling by the
President, the CDS holder would not suffer an “injury in fact.” And even if
it is determined that the owner of the instrument suffered a clear and identifi-
able injury caused by the President’s action, the investor would still lack
standing because there is no direct causation of the injury from the Presi-
dent’s actions, nor would an affirmative ruling redress his injuries.
First, while a Presidential action unilaterally raising the debt ceiling
would prevent the holder of a CDS on U.S. debt from receiving a payout, it
would not cause them an injury. A CDS by nature does not guarantee a
payout because the default of the underlying security may never occur. As
such, while the holder of a CDS would not receive a potential benefit, they
would not suffer any loss. Not receiving a payout after the President’s action
to avoid default denies the CDS holder’s ability to materially improve their
life, but it would not cause their life to be materially worse; they would
remain at their status quo. This, as discussed in Lujan, causes the CDS
holder’s injury to be mere conjecture and not “concrete and
particularized.”238
Following the President’s unilateral increase of the debt ceiling, the
market value of the CDS on U.S. debt would certainly fluctuate; an avoid-
ance of default would decrease the likelihood of a payout on the CDS, which
would decrease its market value. This fluctuation of the market value of the
CDS, however, is not an injury to the holder. The holder would only feel any
gain or loss associated with the CDS when he or she sold the security. Ab-
sent a sale, the holder would not realize the decreased market value of the
CDS. As such, there would be no concrete established injury suffered. Al-
though in securities fraud litigation a plaintiff does not need to sell the secur-
ity to establish sufficient injury, in this situation, the President’s actions do
not constitute fraud or tortious interference with the CDS contract—causing
236 See Credit Default Swap, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/
creditdefaultswap.asp#axzz1v5wMKebh (last visited Mar. 5, 2014), archived at http://perma
.cc/QG8H-UBWD.
237 See Zeitlin, supra note 215. R
238 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
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an unrealized loss caused by market fluctuations to be an insufficient injury
for the CDS holder to have standing to sue the President.239
Assuming, however, that a mere fluctuation in market value of the CDS
is sufficient injury, the CDS holder would still lack standing because her
injury would not be clearly caused by the President, nor would a court order
reversing the President’s actions redress the holder’s injury. For purposes of
standing, the defendant’s actions must clearly cause the injury suffered by
the plaintiff. Here, there is an insufficient nexus between the President’s uni-
lateral increase of the debt ceiling and the decline or fluctuation in the CDS.
While the President’s action would “encourage[ ]” the decrease in market
value of the CDS, the injury was caused by market participants responding
to several external factors.240 Raising the debt ceiling does not necessarily
and directly cause a decline in market value of the CDS. For a decline to
occur, market participants must interpret the President’s action as decreasing
the likelihood of the nation defaulting on its debt, and respond by decreasing
their demand for the CDS. For these reasons, the causal link between the
President’s actions and the decline in market value of the CDS is too attenu-
ated to satisfy standing requirements. In Clapper v. Amnesty International
the Court held that N.S.A. wiretapping programs did not impose a clear and
definite injury to attorneys whose privileged communications with clients
would be interrupted by the program.241 Much like the Court’s determination
that the government’s breach of attorney-client privilege is too uncertain to
actually occur, a decrease in market value of a CDS depends on several
factors outside the purview of the President. And, much like the Court de-
ferred to government activity in Clapper as a means of protecting national
security,242 so too would the Court grant deference to the rights of the Presi-
dent over a CDS holder as a means of ensuring America’s financial stability
and protecting its role as the leader in international finance.243
Nevertheless, even if the Court were to consider the nexus between a
unilateral action by the President to raise the debt ceiling and the decreased
market value of the CDS holder’s security to be sufficiently close, the holder
239 See Gibson v. Credit Suisse AG, 787 F.Supp.2d 1123, 1129 (D. Idaho 2011) (holding
that a “loss[ ] in value to property [is] too conjectural and unascertainable to satisfy the
injury in fact requirement”). But see NECA-IBEW Health & Welfare Fund v. Goldman Sachs
& Co., 693 F.3d 145, 164 (2d Cir. 2012) (suggesting market value decrease does establish
injury in fact). However, the court in NECA-IBEW was deciding the issue of standing in a
lawsuit brought by purchasers of mortgage backed securities against Goldman Sachs, the un-
derwriter. Id. This is a much more direct contractual relationship than a situation where the
holder of a CDS of Treasury securities brings suit against the President.
240 See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 618 (1973).
241 See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, 33 S.Ct. 1138, 1148 (2013).
242 See id. at 1148–49 (discussing the multitude of surveillance options available to the
government and, instead of holding all to be unlawful, asserting the secretive nature of these
programs makes directly tracing any alleged injury to be insufficient for establishing standing
under Article III—thereby implicitly deferring to the need and existence of the programs at
all).
243 See supra Part IV.B.
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would still lack standing because their injury would not be redressable by a
court order reversing the President’s action. Should a court consider the Pres-
ident’s action to be unconstitutional, ostensibly the United States would enter
default. This alone, however, would not remedy the holder’s injury. First, the
CDS is a private contract between the holder and issuer, neither of which is
the President or the federal government. As such, a separate injunction re-
quiring the issuer of the CDS to pay the holder would likely be needed.
Second, even if a separate injunction were unnecessary under the presump-
tion that market fluctuations in the value of the CDS are a sufficient injury, it
is not a certainty that this alone would remedy the holder’s injuries. If the
court order were made by a lower court, the government would most cer-
tainly appeal the decision—making it unclear if the nation actually defaulted
until a final ruling. Similarly, even if the decision were to come from the
Supreme Court, any action or attempted action by Congress to remedy de-
fault, or decisions made by the Secretary of the Treasury to prioritize debt
payments, would postpone actual default. Therefore, CDS counterparties,
and market participants generally, would likely be uncertain as to how to
respond to these diverging signals from the government, which in turn
would limit or deny the ability of the Court declaring the President’s actions
to be unconstitutional to properly remedy the injuries of the CDS holder. A
restoration of a higher market value of the CDS would depend on a positive
response from investors, which would not be certain following the court or-
der. As such, much like the lack of a gold market in Perry denied a remedy
to the bondholder,244 uncertainty as to the specific terms of the CDS contract
in question, as well as how investors will react, would prevent the CDS
holder’s injury from being properly redressed. For these reasons, a CDS
holder would lack standing to sue the President—making a lawsuit challeng-
ing a Presidential action unilaterally raising the debt ceiling to be nonjusti-
ciable, and actual default a constitutional impossibility.
Lastly, even if the courts were to determine that the CDS holder does
have standing to sue the President, as a matter of public policy the Court
would likely bar the holder from seeking remedy. A declaration that a CDS
holder has standing to sue the President necessarily means that the United
States has defaulted on its debt obligations. This, in turn, would cause every
single holder of U.S. Treasury bonds to have standing under Perry to seek
remedy against the government. Allowing this to occur would cause bond-
holders from around the world to seek remedy against the federal govern-
ment—drowning our courts in litigation, halting daily operations in every
economic sector, and placing America’s economic and political security at
risk. As such, in order to prevent this from occurring, as a matter of public
244 Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 357 (1935) (“The discontinuance of gold pay-
ments and the establishment of legal tender currency on a standard unit of value with which all
forms of money of the United States were to be maintained at a parity had a controlling
influence upon the domestic economy. It was adjusted to the new basis. A free domestic mar-
ket for gold was non-existent.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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policy, the Court should deny the rights of a single CDS holder in order to
protect the stability of our nation, and avoid an exacerbation and expansion
of the negative reverberations of national default. For these reasons, both
procedurally and practically, no plaintiff is or should be able to sue the Pres-
ident and defaulting on the national debt is constitutionally impossible.
IV. CONCLUSION
Throughout America’s history, use of debt to fund government expendi-
tures has been a rather contentious issue in American politics—especially
with rising debts and polarization of the political parties in recent history
allowing the threat of default to be used as a political bargaining chip.245 The
Framers of the Public Debt Clause, however, were concerned with ensuring
the nation’s financial stability in order to secure its greater political stabil-
ity.246 Therefore, to remedy this, Congress has taken various actions over the
years to promote political stability and control the use of debt to fund public
spending programs—starting with the creation of the debt ceiling, continu-
ing with a series of both procedural and substantive legislation dedicated to
streamlining a bi-partisan budgeting process, and culminating in the passage
of the BCA in 2011.247 These measures have fallen short, however, from
eliminating threats of default from political discourse entirely because they
disregard the fact that defaulting on American debt obligations is constitu-
tionally impossible. Specifically: (1) a proper reading of the Public Debt
Clause makes default unconstitutional;248 (2) the President’s Article II pow-
ers allow him to unilaterally raise the debt ceiling even if default were possi-
ble;249 and (3) the issue is practically non-justiciable because there is no one
with standing to bring suit.250 As such, Congressional leaders should adopt
an approach to budget negotiations with the mindset that default is impossi-
ble. To do this properly and sufficiently, Congress can: (1) reinstate the
Gephardt Rule; (2) make the McConnell Mechanism permanent; or ideally
(3) repeal the debt ceiling altogether. Only then will threats of default be
eliminated from political discourse entirely—allowing Congress to work in a
bi-partisan manner on consensus-based public spending and deficit reduction
measures with a guarantee of financial stability.251 Accepting the impossibil-
ity of default is vital to our nation’s financial health, and will help secure our
political stability as well.252
245 See supra Part II.C–E.
246 See supra Part IV.A.
247 See supra Part II–III.
248 See supra Part IV.A.
249 See supra Part IV.B.
250 See supra Part IV.C.
251 See supra Part II (discussing how legislative measures that minimized the role of the
debt ceiling in the budget process helped improve budget negotiations and minimized the
negative effects of partisan discourse).
252 See, e.g., supra notes 3–8, 125 and accompanying text. R
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLL\51-2\HLL203.txt unknown Seq: 36 29-MAY-14 7:41
